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Re: Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation
On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 20:34 +0100, Julien TINNES wrote:
> > Yeah, if it came from PaX the randomization would actually be useful.
> > Sorry, I've just woken up and already explained in another post.
> Please, no hard feelings.
> Speaking about implementation of the non executable pages semantics on
> IA32, PaX and Exec-Shield are very different (well not that much since
> 2.6 in fact because PAGEEXEC is now "segmentation when I can").
> But when it comes to ASLR it's pretty much the same thing.
> The only difference may be the (very small) randomization of the brk()
> managed heap on ET_EXEC (which is probably the more "hackish" feature of
> PaX ASLR) but it seems that Arjan is even going to propose a patch for
> that (Is this in ES too ?).
Exec shield randomized brk() too yes.
However that is a both more dangerous and more invasive change to do
correctly (you have no idea how hard it is to get that right for
emacs...) so that's reserved for the second batch of patches once this
first batch is dealt with.
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